Spatialities of Control (Turin 2006) by Vanolo, A
 1 
 
SPATIALITIES OF CONTROL (TURIN 2006) 
 
Alberto Vanolo 
 
Dipartimento Culture, Politica e Società 
Università degli Studi di Torino (Italy) 
alberto.vanolo@unito.it 
 
 
 
DRAFT 
Final version published as: “Spatialities of Control (Turin 2006)”, in V. Bajc (ed.), Surveilling and Securing the Olympics. 
From Toyko 1964 to London 2012 and Beyond, Palgrave MacMillan, New York (2016), pp. 297-318. 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The chapter offers an analysis of the organization, the performance and the perceptions involved in the 
surveillance and security management activities carried on during the 2006 Torino Winter Olympic Games. 
The research, conducted mainly through analysis of policy and security documents, newspaper articles and 
by interviews with local scholars, workers and spectators, will focus on the organization of spaces, on the 
practices of surveillance, and on the technologies involved in the management of the bodies of the 
spectators and the staff in order to guarantee security in the performance of the public ritual of the Games. 
First, the event is be framed in the specific geographical and social context of Torino and the Piedmont 
region. Next, security threats are discussed with reference to the local context, particularly by analysing 
technical and planning documents and newspapers discussing the various presumed menaces to security. 
Then, the governance system and the organization of security spaces are presented. Finally, the last part of 
the paper discusses the different views and perceptions of politicians, spectators and urban social 
movement opposing the Games. 
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Introduction 
 
Turin, a city in north-western Italy with a population of about 900,000 and a metropolitan area of about 1.5 
million was the host of the 2006 Winter Olympics. As the capital of the Piedmont region of 4.3 million 
inhabitants, Turin is the fourth largest Italian city. The headquarters of the automobile manufacturer Fiat 
made the city known as the Italian capital of automobile production and as such has often been compared 
to Detroit.1 As in many other cities dominated by one corporation, the general crisis of the Fordist style 
factory manufacturing starting in the late 1970s has been dramatic, thus laying the foundation for a debate 
on the economic future of the city. Following a devastating automobile crisis in 1996, the metropolitan 
administration lunched an initiative to support the city’s economic diversification and a change of its 
industrial image.  
The bid for the Games was officially won in 1999 in Seoul. The Torino Organizing Committee of the XXth 
Olympic Winter Games of 10–26 February 2006 was officially created that same year and became known as 
TOROC (Torino Organizing Committee). Agenzia Torino 2006 and other organizations were later added to 
the complex governance mechanism which constituted the management of the Games. There was 
substantial political and popular support for this new policy which aimed to change Turin from an industrial 
city to an economically diversified international city. The successful bid for the Games needs to be 
understood in this context. This attitude was well expressed by the mayor:  
 
“As the biggest sporting event, the Games constitute an opportunity for urban regeneration, 
visibility, and international positioning. Already started and well on the way, the Olympics are an 
attempt to build new Turin which will connect its economic tradition with renewal of its 
infrastructure and cultural and tourist attractions.” 
 
The Olympic Games provided an opportunity to show to the world Turin’s “new” urban profile. In this 
sense, in the eyes of the politicians and urban promoters, it was imperative to avoid any kind of problems, 
including threats to security, in order to sustain a narrative of urban success, perfection, and good 
impeccable organization. This narrative was broadcast on television screens all over the world. As a person 
responsible for the Police forces explained: 
 
“The attention of the whole world was not only on Turin and other municipalities involved in the 
Games but also on the presence of grassroots movements opposing the Games. This situation 
imposed on us adoption of a security system encompassing the venues as well as the urban and 
provincial spaces where the Games took place. This security system ensured a planned execution of 
the Games and safety for everyone who participated, be it directly or indirectly. The relevance of 
the XXth Winter Olympic Games and IXth Winter Paralympic Games is such that, to guarantee the 
international image of Italy, the Games must proceed within a framework of maximum security.2  
 
In popular and political discourses, the Olympics have for the most part been celebrated as a great success 
for the city, particularly in terms of its international promotion. Yet, the Games represented a major 
challenge for the redevelopment of both the physical layout of the metropolitan area as much as the 
Olympic valleys. The Olympic “theatre” was much wider than the city boundaries and included seven 
municipalities in the mountain valleys of the Province of Torino. This Olympic geography also included five 
logistic warehouses, two car parks, media villages, and an anti-doping laboratory.  
As is well known, Winter Olympics are significantly smaller than the Summer Games. As we can see in Table 
1, Torino hosted 2633 athletes and 84 medal events. This pales by comparison to the previous host city, 
Athens, where 10,600 athletes competed in 301 medal events during the 2004 Summer Games. 
Nevertheless, Turin’s 900,000 inhabitants were swamped by the 1.1 million tourists who visited the city in 
2006. The shortage of hotel rooms was such that the city officials asked the residents to help accommodate 
this huge influx of tourists by renting their homes or certain rooms of their home to the visitors. 
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Table 1 – Torino 2006: some figures 
 
The event  
15 winter sport disciplines, 84 medal events, 1026 medals awarded 
2700 paid staff and 18000 trained volunteers 
2633 athletes, 2704 officials and companions, 80 National Olympic Committees 
688 journalists from printed press, 6720 radio and television journalists 
7 villages dedicated to the media in the metropolitan area 
345,000 meals served to staff and volunteers 
The spectators 
About 900,000 tickets sold (out of 1,128,000 available tickets) 
59% of the purchased tickets were for urban sporting events, 36% for mountain events, 5% for ceremonies 
172,000 tickets (19%) sold to corporate partners 
70% of sales to the general public were to persons from Italy, followed by Switzerland (6%), Germany (6%), 
France (6%), Norway (3%), USA (3%). 
About 1.1 million tourists in 2006 
The material structures 
5100 computers 
90,000 accreditation badges 
8000 square meters of PVC applied to the outside of the buildings with Games logos 
The safety system 
1740 TOROC personnel (paid and volunteers) with tasks connected to safety and surveillance 
202 x-ray machines 
463 metal detectors 
922 hand wands (hand-held metal detectors) 
 
Source: All data from Torino 2006, Final Report (official concluding report developed for the IOC) 
 
 
Below I analyze the complex governance and management system, designed to coordinate between the 
Organizing Committee and the surveillance and security forces. I focus on how technologies were 
implemented through the organization of space, describe surveillance practices, and discuss the 
experiences and perceptions of surveillance by the people involved in the Games. For this analysis, I 
consulted a number of different documents: Olympic management documents, the Olympic bid, the Host 
City Contract, the final report on the Games, debriefing materials, documents from the Italian police forces, 
strategic planning documents from security and safety managers, mass media reports, and secondary data. 
Between June and September 2009, I also conducted formal interviews and informal conversations with 
various people who were involved in the Games.  
 
 
Defining threats to security 
 
Prevention of threats to security entails what Michel Foucault referred to as biopolitical practices. Such 
practices control actions of individuals, for example, denying them access to specific places and in this way, 
limiting their mobility in space. The definition of what is allowed and what is not allowed, that is, the 
boundary between “reasonable” and “excessive” control over the practices of the local population and the 
actors in the Olympic event is a delicate issue which is often politically and socially contested.  
The question of detection and classification of potential threats to security became an interesting issue. An 
initial list of potential perils was compiled by a technical team lead by the Torino Organizing Committee 
safety manager and presented in a Preliminary Strategic Plan elaborated by Torino Organizing Committee 
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in 2002.3 Threats compiled in this list were divided into two general categories. The first category included 
risks connected to traffic conditions, bad weather, fires, floods, and other environmental disasters; 
accidental and malicious technological risks, and risks connected to image of the national prestige and the 
Olympic family. The second category of risks was referred to as “severe risks” and included terrorism in the 
form of violent demonstrations and public protests, disorders by non-global movements, and organized 
crime. The Minister of the Interior responsible for security matters was quoted as saying that “security 
planning for the Olympics means continuously updating elements connected to scenario dynamics,” 
implying that  the list had to be considered as merely indicative rather than complete.4 Indeed, there was a 
striking difference between the abovementioned list of “severe risks,” which was published in a 
confidential document meant to be used only internally and all successive Torino Organizing Committee 
documents which were made public. In fact, this list of security threats disappeared from the later 
documents all together, creating a possibility – at least publically if not internally – for more amicable 
attitudes towards demonstrations and social movements. An official responsible for the Police Forces later 
explained to me that “respect of constitutional freedoms and respect for the right of those intending to 
manifest and express their ideas in a peaceful way had to be guaranteed” but did not comment about the 
disappearance of the initial list of security threats.5 
The local imaginary of fear was articulated in mass media coverage and in planning documents in the form 
of two “severe risks.” At the forefront of terrorist fears was Islamic fundamentalism. Examples of this 
“threat” were newspaper articles titled “Torinistan and the Olympic truce” or “Assault risk for Olympics and 
elections” which warned the public that “among recurrent menaces of Islamic-inspired attacks, attempts to 
revise a new armed party alarmed no global itches (…) but this is not a reason to be joyful”.6 As also 
expressed by the Minister of the Interior, “because of their worldwide echo, the Turin Olympics run the risk 
to raise a great interest in the eyes of Al Qaeda’s strategists”.7 
Equally threatening to security of the Olympics was a long lasting conflict surrounding a high-speed railway 
project in Val di Susa, a valley north-west of Turin which was a part of the Olympic landscape. The local 
population and environmentalist organizations, only partially interested in sports events, were fiercely 
opposed to the railway project. Their activism was seen as a threat and was represented by the mass media 
as responsible for terrorist attacks. Apprehension against these activists grew even stronger after 
protesters succeeded in altering the path of the Olympic torch, prompting the local media to turn against 
them with titles such as “The torch surrenders to anti-[rail].”8 As an official connected to the police 
explained in an interview: 
 
The national political situation, the international scenario, the situation emerging in Valle di Susa as 
a consequence of the [high-speed railway] works required, at least for the duration of the Olympic 
and Paralympic Games, the planning of a system which would guarantee order and public security, 
it required setting up a complex system of vigilance over potential targets in Turin and the 
province.9 
 
Some protest movements denounced severe repression by the police during that period and the 
impossibility of practicing what Lefebvre (1968) calls people’s “right to the city”. Part of it was related to 
the evacuation of squatter houses in the city centre shortly before the Games. One of these squatter 
houses had been occupied since 1986 and was evacuated in July 2005. Today, the building houses a travel 
office for students.10 By September, only four months before the Games, two other squatter houses were 
evacuated. The official reasons behind these evacuations were not connected directly to the Games but to 
some violent incidents which occurred during a protest a few months earlier. The timing of these 
evacuations, however, raised suspicions, and the independent media firmly denounced what it called a 
repressive policy aimed at “hindering” dissident voices.  
This is a particularly sensitive topic, because of the risk that security measures could be used in order to 
limit the possibility of public participation. The major local protest movements, named Nolimpiadi,11 
denounced, particularly through the Internet and unofficial posters, a number of issues fully in line with the 
police framing presented above: for example, the lobbying of the urban elite in order to manage the games, 
environmental damage, waste of money, corruption. In particular, in 2003, the movement asked, without 
success, for a public referendum in order to decide whether to host the event.  
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A public protest against companies providing surveillance technology, particularly companies which also 
provided technologies for warfare in Iraq took place as well. Technologies involved in the organization of 
the event were often provided by northern Italian enterprises (as Elsag Datamat) and implemented by 
Italian experts. In some cases, this has led to criticism from social movements that opposed the Games. For 
example, police forces acquired new radios, called Tetra (terrestrial trunked radio) produced by the Italian 
firm, Selex Communications. According to the protest movements, the purchase was just a business 
transaction in order to enrich Selex Communications.12 According to other voices13, acquiring the new radio 
system has provided and has left in the province a valuable technological heritage for local police forces. In 
other cases, technologies came from outside Italy, like metal detectors provided by the American company 
Garrett, a well known provider of Olympic security technologies.14 
 
 
Internet threats 
 
A threat not explicitly mentioned in the official documents, but discussed in popular news,15 referred to 
hackers and Internet attacks. The topic has not rarely been associated to ideas of “antagonism”. According 
to a newspaper article: 
 
“The antagonist area is also under the control of police, not just for potential clamorous acts, but 
because of informatics attacks. Last Friday, in fact, a so-called “netstrike” against both the official 
website of the Games and the Coke website has been organized (…)”16 
 
It is curious, for example, to note the use of the expression cybersquatting with reference to the 
registration of commercial web domains with names similar to that of an official organization (in this case, 
www.torino2006.it), a phenomenon that was effectively faced by the Italian police before the Games. Put it 
differently, internet security has been imbued with a sort of spatial imaginary, with websites represented 
as spaces that may be “occupied”, “attacked” and “squatted”, and therefore to be “defended” and 
“protected”. 
 
 
Public-Private Security Partnership 
 
The Host City Contract between Turin and the International Olympic Committee was quite explicit with 
reference to security, giving full responsibility to host countries:  
 
“Responsibility for all aspects of security is a matter to be dealt with by the appropriate authorities 
of the Host Country. The City, the National Olympic Committee [i.e. CONI] and the Organizing 
Committee for the Games [i.e. TOROC] undertake that all appropriate and necessary security 
measures shall be taken accordingly.”17  
 
In the Italian case, by law, the national government is formally responsible for security. In the case of the 
Torino Winter Games, without denying in any way the full responsibility of the government, the public 
sector (the police service, but also military forces, fire brigades, medical services, etc.) cooperated with the 
private sector, represented by Torino Organizing Committee. Specifically, Torino Organizing Committee was 
assigned coordination tasks, particularly with reference to the management of what is referred to as 
“passive” security functions in the Olympic venues such as choices and locations of technologies and 
practices for security, from fences to ticket control. In the official documents, the distinction between 
“passive” and “active” security is only implicit and nowhere defined. By reading the documents, however, it 
becomes apparent that “passive” security functions refer to technologies, including identification cards, 
keys, locks, fences, lights, alarms. As I discuss below, Torino Organizing Committee staff was also involved 
in scrutinizing identification cards.18 
According to Italian laws (n. 121/81), the Ministero degli Interni, the Italian ministry responsible for 
security, specifically through the National Council for Security, assigned to the Prefect of Torino (which is 
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the representative of the Italian government in the Province) the planning and management of security 
issues for the Olympic event. In order to develop security coordination functions, Torino Organizing 
Committee organized a taskforce named TOROC Games Security, with the aim of planning and organizing 
surveillance for persons (for example, with metal detectors), vehicles (in specific Vehicle Screening Areas), 
goods (by a Vendor Certification Programme) and venues (by cameras, patrolling and other technologies). 
In July 2003 a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the Prefect and Torino Organizing Committee, 
further clarifying the functions assigned to Torino Organizing Committee. 
The strategic planning of security, coordinated by the Prefect of Torino, started about five years before the 
event, leading at the end of 2004 to the publication of a guideline document19 indicating specific goals to be 
reached in terms of security. The operative planning, coordinated by the Questura di Torino (the provincial 
police office), was intended as the way to reach those goals. The 2005 planning document established two 
more institutional bodies: one “technical taskforce”, including Questore, various representatives of police 
forces, firemen, majors, health sector and other stakeholders; and one “operative central”, a command and 
control centre for all police forces.20 
The activities carried on by the police were managed by a central body, the Centro di Coordinamento21, and 
by a series of units in the various Olympic venues. Among the various functions of the central body it can be 
mentioned the coordination of external security forces in case of major accidents, as military forces in case 
of terrorism, the circulation of information between the various police and military forces, coordination 
with security activities of local municipalities, and particularly Protezione Civile, a voluntary service for 
supporting eventual emergencies. The use of police forces, by the end of the games, constituted about 
9279 persons, with about 170 police officers from small municipalities in the Province, and 316 military 
personnel with specific surveillance tasks.  
Regarding the Games security function of Torino Organizing Committee, a complex governance system was 
implemented during the planning period before the event. The highest level was the “head of games 
security”, whose duty was to organize the Torino Organizing Committee planning functions, supported by 
an impressive number of specific managers, including the various “Venue Security Managers”, the “Security 
Integration Manager” with coordination functions, the “Workforce Manager”, responsible for workers with 
the help of a “Volunteers manager” and a “Paid Staff Manager”, a “Transport & Logistics Manager”, 
regarding security in transports, a “Law Enforcement Liaison Manager” for cooperation with the police, 
“Security Technology Systems Management” for security instruments and technologies, “Sponsor & NOC 
Liason manager” regarding enterprises and external national Olympic committees. Inside every Olympic 
venue, apart form the Venue Security Manager, there were a number of other managers, for example, 
several “Deputy Venue Security Managers” for various support activities, “Control Room Supervisor” and 
“Sectoral Commanders”, responsible for security systems, security volunteers with patrolling and 
authorization-check functions, and private security guards. 
During the Games, the TOROC Games Security function included a staff of 204 employees, 202 temporary 
external contractors, and 1536 volunteers. For the coordination of problems that could not be solved in 
specific venues or management areas, Torino Organizing Committee created the Main Operations Centre, a 
unit internal to Torino Organizing Committee whose function was to guarantee information flows during 
the Olympic Games to all interested organizations (for example, providing event timetables to police 
forces) and to manage possible critical events. Each of the potential problems emerging during the Games 
had to be reported to the Main Operations Centre, which classified according to severity (low, medium, 
high, crisis) and management scale for resolution (venue or central level, favoring when possible the lower 
level). A specific plan, named the “Incident and Crisis Management Plan”, was ready to be implemented in 
case of severe crisis. The physical collocation of the Main Operations Centre was coterminous to the central 
body for the management of police forces (the abovementioned Centro di Coordinamento), favoring 
dialogue between the two bodies (see Figure 1). 
The whole security system was developed on the basis of the experience of previous Olympic Games. In the 
framework of the process of knowledge transfer promoted by the IOC, the manager for security of Torino 
Organizing Committee visited and discussed the topic with managers of other Olympic cities. From my 
conversations with a Torino Organizing Committee safety manager,22 it became clear that the Barcelona 
Olympics – and the work of their main manager Santiago De Sicart – was considered a sort of “best 
practice” in the field. As reported in the newspapers after the Games, the head of games security of Torino 
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Organizing Committee declared that the experience of Torino could now also be considered a successful 
example.23 According to my interview, this process of knowledge transfer from the Torino experience to the 
next Games started with a debriefing in Vancouver in 2006, where the purpose of the meeting was to 
disseminate the Italian experience by presentations, discussions, and diffusion of materials. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Main Operations Centre  – physical layout 
 
 
Source: File #31, “Analysis of command, control and communication operations”, in The Torino 2006 Olympic 
Experience. The Official Debriefing & Final Analysis of the XX Olympic Winter Games, Torino 2006 dvd. 
 
 
Technologies and spaces of security 
 
Regarding the organization of space, Torino Organizing Committee and the police forces introduced various 
classifications. On a wide geographical scale, the Olympic theatre was organized in three areas with three 
distinct persons in charge of security: the urban space of Torino; Val di Susa and Pragelato; Pinerolo and 
Torre Pellice. The various venues were then classified further into three categories. Competitive venues 
included all tracks and courts, as ski runs or hockey fields. Non-competitive venues included the medal 
plaza and the media village. The residential venue referred to the Olympic villages and hotels. Each of the 
three categories of venues had different schedules and time-tables for security. 
At the level of the single venues, the most important conceptualization of space refers to the organizing of 
a system of concentric rings (see Figure 2). Each venue was divided into three rings: the soft ring at the 
outer edge, the hard ring further towards the center, and the security ring in the heart of the venue. 
Looking through various documents, I found no explanation for what was meant by “hard ring”.  
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Figure 2 – Security Rings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: personal elaboration based on interviews with security forces. 
 
 
Most of the venues are characterized by just two rings: the hard and soft. The hard ring contains what was 
referred to as “vital structures”. The concept was not clearly defined. Its boundaries are delimitated by 
security fences, about 2.70 meters high, security patrols, security lighting, closed-circuit television 
surveillance systems and anti-intrusion systems. Closed-circuit television cameras were set every 60 meters 
along the perimeter of the hard ring, with the addition, in some areas, of “dome” cameras characterized by 
high resolution (about 100 meters range). All the cameras were linked to a closed-circuit television monitor 
room inside the venue, and supervised by Torino Organizing Committee staff 24 hours a day. 
In each of the three Olympic Villages, a third ring named security ring was planned inside the hard ring, and 
isolated by a 2 meters high fence: all persons entering this ring were fully inspected. I have not had the 
possibility to clearly define which physical structures were located inside and outside the ring, because the 
venue manager I interviewed had doubtful memories about that,24 and no specific mention of it can be 
found in planning documents. We may probably assume that the security ring hosted the rooms of the 
athletes.  
Outside the hard ring, a soft ring includes “load” and “drop off” zones for passengers accessing the venue, 
parking for the vehicles with specific passes issued by the Torino Organizing Committee, and check-in for 
spectators. I discuss the check-in process in more detail below. The intensity of these controls depended on 
the nature of the venue. Competitive venues, such as the medal plaza and the Olympic stadium for the 
occasion of the opening ceremony had temporary security controls. The Olympic villages and media villages 
had permanent security controls. 
Both the hard and the soft rings are each divided in the “front stage” space, or “front”, and the “back 
stage” space or the “back of the house”. Access to the back of the house was granted only to workers. This 
included the Olympic Family, the athletes, the media, and the Torino Organizing Committee team.  
The soft ring does not have physical boundaries, but is encircled by a wider area where the planned 
activities include: 
 
- wide-area controls along the perimeter of urban or mountain centers, 
- random controls over suspicious vehicles or persons,  
- notification of activities of groups of demonstrators wishing to get closer to the venues or 
important places in order to start demonstrations, 
- immediate verification of alarms or signals of suspicious activity, if necessary by asking the help 
of police dogs or explosive experts, 
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- sensitizing personnel about the need to signal to the Operative Central every anomaly or 
ambiguous situation that may cause troubles to the Games. 
  
The management of these security spaces implied a large set of technologies and practices. Concerning 
physical enclosures, for example, different types of fences were utilized according to the material layout of 
spaces: strong metallic fences where possible, lighter plastic fences in areas with trees and rocks, and 
cement based fences near highways. To take another example, video surveillance was implemented with 
700 cameras, 100 km of optical cables, and many hours of staff training.  
As mentioned, it is also possible to refer to the defense of the virtual Internet space, since ICT experts 
prevented an undefined number of intrusion attempts by hackers. Concerning ICTs, it is interesting to 
consider, from a technical point of view, that the most sensitive information was located in a separate 
intranet, called Info2006 which was not accessible from the standard, global, internet, reproducing the 
spatial imaginary of the rigid separation between the hard and the soft ring.25 
 
  
Control of Behavior and Movement of Spectators 
 
Control over the body, the behavior, and the movement of spectators, what Michel Foucault famously 
referred to as biopolitics, was implemented in different ways. As emphasized in various documents, 
including the webpage of the Ministry of the Interior, the presence of the police had to be non-invasive and 
as invisible as possible, guaranteeing an enjoyable experience for the public: 
 
“An organization of security adequate to possible menaces has been implemented. Overall, the 
“Olympic spirit” has prevailed, and the visibility of the police force has been kept as low as possible, 
always maintaining a high and vigilant level of surveillance.”26 
  
Controls over the spectators started with the sale of the entry tickets for sporting competitions. The sale 
started in November 2004. Tickets were available through an internet website, a call centre with a toll free 
phone number, branches of a local bank, and a number of other authorized vendors. Events such as the 
medals ceremonies were not available for purchase to the general public. These tickets were distributed by 
Torino Organizing Committee free of charge only to specific guests and to some locals. On the front of each 
ticket, there was information in English and Italian about the venue for which the ticket was issued, the 
gate through which the visitor must enter with his or her specific ticket, the seating zone within which the 
spectator must be positioned, the seat number to which that ticket holder is assigned, the time of the 
event, the price, and an anti-duplication hologram (see Table 4). Visitors had to abide by “Terms and 
Conditions” as specified on the back of each ticket and also published on the internet and in the spectator 
guide which I discuss below. When seeking access to an event using such a ticket, the visitor waives a 
number of rights, particularly the right to disseminate for public or commercial use photos taken take by 
the visitor at the event, the right not to be filmed or photographed by the organizers during the event, and 
eventually even the right to access to the venue if the spectator opposes to specific rules of the venues.  
 
Together with the ticket, the viewer received an “Official spectator guide”,27 a 176 pages document 
describing “rules”, “suggestions”, and “information”.  
Concerning the rules, it was strictly forbidden for the spectator to carry objects deemed by the organizers 
as dangerous, including glasses, drugs, weapons, lighters, and even coins. In addition, other objects were 
restricted, such as large objects, cameras, smelly or noisy objects, food, and anything showing a logo or a 
commercial political or religious message. Once admitted, the spectator was not allowed to leave the 
premises. If the spectator left the premises, he or she would not be allowed to return to that same venue. 
The spectator guide also included “suggestions” about appropriate behavior such as not to try getting close 
to the venues with a private car and general information about the city and the events.  
The limitation of the “commercial messages” is an interesting point. As it is well known, sponsors pay for 
the exclusive exploitation of the marketing of the games. For this reason, a specific part of the security 
activity was carried on by a team called Brand Protection Unit, which sought out and avoided the display of 
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any non-sponsor logo, the so-called “ambush marketing”. In order to carry out this function, for example, 
adhesive tape was used to hide logos, even in the case of instrumentation used for the games, as the brand 
of the pc monitors, and commercial activities as restaurants and bars could be fined for showing Olympic 
logos and brands. In the case of spectators and the working team, for example, they were not allowed 
access to the front rows of the venues if wearing a tee-shirt with an evident logo, and adhesive tape was 
used also in this case, and even on some athletes.28 
The control of the body of the spectator was extended by banning the consumption of any food or drink, 
apart from non-commercial water, not sold by the sponsors inside the venues. As affirmed by an 
International Olympic Committee spokeswoman: “the IOC works hard to protect the investment of our 
partners. Without their contribution the Olympic Games couldn’t happen the way they do”.29 
The most evident moment of control refers to the checking and the limiting of access to specific places, and 
particularly to the hard ring. The control procedures for admission to the venues were quite similar to 
those of an airport. First, a Torino Organizing Committee employee, called “pacer”, organized the queue, 
gave instructions (remembering, for example, the objects not allowed), and checked the tickets, then, a 
policeman checked persons with a metal detector. In case of a light signal, the person was invited to empty 
his/her pockets into a specific box, and then to go through the portal again. A second check was then 
conducted by hand-wand detectors, and this was the only check, in case of peculiar situations such as 
wheelchair-users. At the same time, an x-ray machine checked bags. The procedure for checking bags was 
called “mag and bag”. Objects eventually found to be prohibited had to be disposed of in a specific box. 
Finally, a Torino Organizing Committee employee stamped the ticket and indicated to the spectator where 
to go in order to enjoy the event. 
 
 
Surveillance of Staff and Special Guests through the Accreditation System 
 
Security measures were organized for the various workers connected to the event, for example, deliveries 
staff, athletes, journalists, Torino Organizing Committee members, cleaners, etc. The management of their 
bodies happened through a complex accreditation system, always associated with the exhibition of a 
proper identity card. I wish to draw attention to the fact that the accreditation system is so powerful as to 
represent a space of “exception to the norm” with reference to standard European immigration policies. 
Members of the IOC, national federations, national Olympic committees and specific journalists and 
sponsors had access to a special Olympic card that, together with a passport, allowed them to enter Italy 
independently from a visa.30 Members of the Olympic staff received just one card, independent of the 
number of their tasks. The cards were checked visually. 
The accreditation system was managed by Torino Organizing Committee, and about 90,000 badges were 
produced.31  The system was organized in four steps: registration of potential accredited persons, 
confirmation, checking (by workers of the Ministero degli Interni or by police) and, finally, printing and 
delivery of the badges. All the accreditation requests come from organizations involved with the Games, 
and not from single persons. The printing and delivery of the badges happened as late as possible, in order 
to avoid risk of forgery. Even police forces had their accreditation badges. 
Inside every venue, six different areas were accessible to people with different types of accreditation cards. 
For example, a specific access applied just to journalists, another one for TV cameramen, and another one 
for athletes. Moreover, in particularly sensitive areas, such as the playing field or the anti-doping centre, 
access was further restricted, allowing just those with specific additional passes. In case of loss of the pass, 
this was to be immediately communicated to Torino Organizing Committee accreditation centre, and 
badges could be withdrawn in case of violation of the norms. It was obligatory to keep the badge visible at 
all times when on duty.  
A Torino Organizing Committee environmental manager described the inspection in the following way: 
 
“Every morning I was submitted to mag and bag, independently of the fact that, after months of 
work, I knew the policeman at the entrance very well, and of my accreditation badge. It was a 
control similar to that in airports.”32 
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Finally, specific security measures were implemented for the movement of guest stars, like celebrities or 
athletes receiving awards in the medal plaza. Technical details defined the distribution of police forces, the 
movements with cars, and the organization of radio contacts. In specific situations, snipers were located in 
unseen places. The management of celebrities is a complex task, partly because of the overlapping of 
functions between local police and foreign bodyguards and security teams.  
In the case of athletes, the management of bodies was strictly connected to a complex system of transports 
and movements called in the documents “bubble to bubble”, and referring to bus movements and security 
escorts to and from villages and competition venues (including airspace surveillance) and using specific 
supervised drop off/load in zones. From the arrival at the airport, and specifically from a guarded area, 
buses departed every 20 minutes for one of the three Olympic villages (in total, nine buses every hour), 
escorted by police officers. The movements between the villages and the venues took place along pre-
defined routes, and inside checked buses. This system allowed the athletes to move from a “secured” place 
(one “bubble”) to another one without having contact with the “external” world, thus making it 
unnecessary to check the athletes on arrival at a venue. Of course, the athletes were free to exit from the 
village and then come back (when they would be checked by the security agents at the entrance), but it 
was quite unusual for them to do so. In the case of ceremonies (like medals awards), specific escort services 
were organized and provided by police from the Olympic Village to the Medal Plaza and back. As shown in 
Figure 5, the three central cars are intended to transport the three athletes winning the gold, silver and 
bronze medals. It is worth to note that this is just one of the many configurations of the escort services, 
with variations, for example, according to the presence or absence of the anti-doping service. 
A similar system was implemented for vehicles, which were considered potentially even more risky than 
persons, because of the many possibilities to hide forbidden objects. Every vehicle wishing to access the 
hard ring had to display on the windscreen a particular pass, named VAPP. In specific “vehicle screening 
areas”, located close to the hard ring, the vehicles were checked by the police with hand wands and 
inspections. In case of goods deliveries, a system of “keys”, including checking of the delivery schedule, the 
certification of inspection, and the seals of the delivered boxes was put in place.33 Moreover, in the soft 
ring the access to vehicles was limited to specific categories, such as residents’ cars. Residents, in order to 
access the soft ring by car, had to display on their vehicles a specific pass showing the car’s registration 
plate and the soft ring code.  
Finally, it has to be mentioned that, throughout the city, a number of Olympic Lanes, marked by yellow 
stripes and Olympic symbols, were established by the Major of the city in order to allow the effective 
movement of police forces, ambulances and other assistance vehicles, and Olympic athletes. 
 
 
Life inside the Olympic Village 
 
Inside residential zones in the Olympic Villages (the one in Torino, i.e., the largest, hosted about 2600 
persons, mostly athletes and journalists, in more than 100,000 square meters), further controls occurred in 
the security ring and adjacent streets. Life in the villages was basically separated from the rest of the urban 
space, with specific events and amenities (like disco parties), which were communicated to the athletes 
through a newsletter and contributed to creating a sense of community, for example, celebrating birthdays. 
A shopping centre and a relaxation area were provided inside the village, as were interfaith prayer sessions, 
Broadway shows, and all sorts of live concerts, special parties, and videogames for the duration of the 
Games. This kind of internal organization of the life inside the village makes the metaphor of the “bubble” 
used by Torino Organizing Committee even more pertinent. Its environmental manager puts it this way: 
“there was everything inside the village, the barbers, the flower shop, the mini-market… it was a sort of 
Love Boat”.34 He was referring to the famous television series from the 1980s, where all the stories and 
relationships took place on a cruise ship. This analogy fully grasps the idea of an ideal small world, where 
everything is provided in order to avert the need to interact with the outside world.  
As a form of surveillance over athletes, attention must be paid to drug tests as well. According to the 
guidelines of the World Anti-Doping Agency and the IOC, controls aim at detecting the use, or potential use, 
of illicit substances, so as the refusal or faking of biological inspections. Anti-doping analyses have been 
considered part of the medical services. Every competitive venue and every Olympic village included a 
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doping control station, where biological samples were collected every day from a random sample of 
athletes. After the daily casual choice of the names of the athletes to be checked, volunteers of the Olympic 
team called “escorts” had to quickly reach the athletes and alert them to go to the doping control station 
within an hour. Escorts were supposed to follow the athletes during the following hour, in order to avoid 
actions potentially falsifying the anti-doping analysis. Once at the doping control station, biological samples 
from the athletes were collected and stored in specific bags. Then, the responsible for the doping control 
station carried the samples to the central anti-doping lab, where doctors qualified by the Italian Federation 
for Medical Sport performed the analysis. In case of the detection of drugs, the President of the medical 
commission informed the IOC executive committee. 
 
 
How participants evaluated surveillance  
 
As mentioned above, the head of security of Torino Organizing Committee considers the Torino experience 
as a successful best practice, and many local politicians celebrated the good performance of the Games. For 
example, the Minister of the Interior, who was responsible for security stated, in a public conference 
immediately after the Games: “The wide and sophisticated security system for the Olympic Games has 
worked perfectly”.35 As he proudly reported on the Ministery of Interior website website, it even impressed 
the former mayor of New York, Rudolph Giuliani, who saw the Torino performance as “A perfect example 
of what to do in presence of terrorist menaces.”36 
When it comes to measures taken to ensure security, it is difficult to evaluate the perception of the public. 
A relevant survey was carried on during the events by Lisa Delphi Neirotti:37 it refers to questionnaires 
submitted to three samples of spectators, in the pre-games period, with questions referring to 
expectations, motivations and services, during the games, referring to issues on the nature of services 
received, and after the games in relation to impact/overall satisfaction. The questionnaire also asked the 
spectators to express how they felt about security and the surveillance system to which they were exposed 
during the Games. The results show that a large majority of the people, 62.7% described the measures as 
appropriate. The word evokes ideas of meaningful, reasonable and effective surveillance. A comparison 
with the Athens Olympics is interesting. As Tsukala analyzes in the previous chapter, two years earlier, the 
Athens Games were conspicuously saturated with surveillance technologies and procedures and yet, over 
73% of the respondents agreed that these measures were appropriate. The remaining 37.3% of the 
respondents in the Torino case were divided between those who perceived the surveillance system as too 
lenient and others who perceived it as too intrusive. 
This general survey confirms the interviews I conducted for the purposes of this chapter. Of the 20 people 
interviewed, most described the surveillance practices without any particular emphasis. That is, during our 
conversations, these respondents had no particular memories and no vivid emotions about surveillance 
practices and technologies used during the Games. I asked the respondents “Do you think it was 
appropriate, lenient or intrusive?”. Of the 20 interviewees 17 reported surveillance as “useful”, 
“appropriate” and “not particularly invasive”. Only 3 people found it excessive. These three people were 
relatively young spectators, one female and two males, between 25 and 35 years of age. All three felt that 
surveillance was “annoying” and “too rigid” because it prevented them from moving around inside the 
venues. A young female spectator related the following:  
 
“I was going to see half pipe: I had a place in full tribune, but I wanted to move to the pipe border 
in order to see the evolution more closely, but there was no way to convince the loyal and 
dreadfully elderly volunteers.”38 
 
“Half pipe” is a snowboard competition, and by “full tribune” she meant that she had bought a quite 
expensive ticket in a privileged part of the spectator area. Her reference to the too-rigid elderly volunteers 
refers to the fact that, not infrequently, Torino Organizing Committee volunteers in mountain areas were 
elderly, retired persons who were well trained to perform this task. Here we see that practices of control 
over space hampered the spectators from moving outside the sector assigned with their ticket. My 
respondents noticed that these spaces were vacant in that nobody was sitting on those chairs so in their 
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mind, these seats were “free”, “available” and actually “more enjoyable” because they provided an even 
better visual angle to the competition. At the same time, in their perception, moving to those chairs would 
in no way compromise security or the general management of the event. A male spectator related that “It 
was excessive to block the access to Bardonecchia to every non-resident: in order to get to the venue I had 
to make an impressively long walk.”39 Put it differently, he considered the practice of limiting cars 
circulation annoying and excessive, probably because no particular perils or threats to security were 
perceived by him. The evaluation of the effectiveness of security is more complicated in the case of working 
staff, due to the lack of data sources. According to a Torino Organizing Committee manager: “It always 
seemed to me an accurate service; I don’t know if it was excessive, but I think it was inspired by a 
prevention approach.”40 
Journalists and sponsors had something different to say. In a file from the Vancouver debriefing after 
Torino 2006, for example, it is reported that in the main press centre it was “relaxed”, with “effective 
security; enough mag/bag machines to avoid delays.” 41  Another file describes media security as 
“redundant”, affirming that “the venue became a police station rather than a media centre: the constant 
issue was too many police officers in the venue without proper roles and often without accreditation.”42 
Most criticisms come from the sponsors, such as Omega, Samsung, Atos Origin, and Visa: they saw 
surveillance as something “to be improved”, due to difficulties of access to the venues, inconsistent 
behavior of security representatives, and according to Atos Origin, not enough secure access to the Torino 
Organizing Committee headquarters.43 
A different and interesting technical debate following the Games took place during the Vancouver 
debriefing of 2006, when Cesare Vaciago, the Chief Executive Officer of the Torino Games, affirmed that 
the use of the mag and bag system was “a waste of money”, basically because it required too much 
personnel, and it could not stop non-metallic weapons.44 This position has been strongly criticized by many 
experts, while others sympathized, affirming that such technologies just gave a “security feeling”, and not 
real control over risks, and that the Olympic committees are lobbied by the producers of such technologies 
(ibid). 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The case of Torino confirms that the management of security involves highly spatialized practices: as 
described in the chapter, the organization of surveillance involved massive classifications of spaces and 
flows. Security rings, fences, and rules for the movement of spectators, athletes, workers, cars, goods are 
all examples of dispositives for controlling the space and the movement of people within the space of the 
Games. Because of the relatively small dimension of Torino and its neighboring territories, the Games had a 
massive impact over space in both physical and discursive ways, being intended as an opportunity for the 
promotion of alternative development paths, and for showing to the world a renewed image of culture and 
hospitality. The public enthusiasm concerning the Games, with an impressive participation of volunteers 
(about 18,000) has to be framed in this general imaginary, and confirms the nature of the event as a 
“recruitment agency” providing, for the local society of Torino, a strong communitas experience.45 This 
probably contributed to a relaxed attitude towards surveillance practices: voices opposing the Games had a 
limited role, and no particular resistance to the Games and to the practices of body and space control 
spread during the event.46 This frames the Torino experience in quite a different way with respect to Beijing 
2008, which will be examined in the next chapter. 
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